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I consider a repeated trust game played between a group of insiders, arranged in a network
representing their lines of communication, and a single outsider. Insiders follow a local
punishment rule, shunning the outsider if it has cheated them or a neighbor. The object
of interest is that the outsider may know either summary statistics about the nature of the
network, or know its precise non-anonymous structure. For the outsider to have knowledge
of the precise structure may, depending on the shape of the network, increase or decrease
the volume of honest interaction that can be sustained. In extreme cases, a small ‘local’
vulnerability to outside exploitation can result in a total breakdown of the chance for mu-
tually beneficial trade across the whole network. Strategic ignorance and obfuscation of
network structure may therefore be valuable to both sides, complicating the problem for a
network operator seeking to monetize data on the network graph. I discuss recent decisi-
ons by Twitter and Facebook in this framework.
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1 Introduction
Consider a network of insiders who interact repeatedly with an outside entity in a trust game.
The outsider faces an immediate temptation to exploit the person with whom they are currently
interacting, but a long term incentive to maintain good relationships with insiders. Can the
threat of punishment by a person’s network neighbors give the outsider an incentive to ‘play
nice’ that is strong enough to sustain honest interaction?
A key consideration is how much information the outsider has on the structure of the net-
work. The outsider may have very precise information, able to see the exact structure of the
network, including the exact location and neighborhood of individual nodes. Alternatively, it
may have only general information about the network, perhaps knowing summary statistics
about the level of connectivity, or knowing the exact structure but not knowing which node
occupies which position. I will focus here on how the outsider values these two general types
of information about the network in the context of the repeated interaction game.
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My main finding is that more precise information about the network structure is not neces-
sarily more valuable to the outsider. The reason is that more information reveals to the outsider
exactly which nodes in the network are strongly protected by a large number of neighbors, and
which nodes are weakly protected by a small number of neighbors. Poorly protected nodes
that may have been masked by high average connectivity in the network are revealed to be
vulnerable when the precise structure of the network is revealed.
The volume of ‘honest’ interaction that can be sustained in the repeated interaction game
may, depending on the network’s structure, be increased or decreased by the outsider posses-
sing more precise information. Under the regime of the outsider having either the summary
statistic or anonymized information, either all nodes are vulnerable to exploitation or none are.
In extreme cases, networks in which no nodes were vulnerable under these regimes can have
all honest interaction destroyed by the outsider obtaining precise network information. These
cases are characterized (informally) by a lack of redundant paths and a lack of cliques. The
converse is not complete: networks in which all nodes were vulnerable under the regimes with
less information can have at best some, but not all, honest interaction restored by the outsider
obtaining precise network information.
The mechanism here is that local sparseness in a network can lead to global vulnerabi-
lity. Consider a network in which individuals have a high number of connections on average,
but with wide variation in the number of connections per node. Irredundancies—informally
speaking, insiders with no or few mutual friends—in one area of such a network can cause a
recursive chain reaction of susceptibility to exploitation that can ultimately result in no mutu-
ally beneficial interaction taking place. In the opposite direction, local sub-networks that are
well-connected among themselves can be salvaged as secure if their area is revealed by precise
network data to be more cyclically connected than the whole-network average.
The general idea of this setup could apply to different types of interaction. A few examples:
Example 1: unverifiable service
In many buyer-seller relationships it is difficult for buyers to concretely verify the quality
of the work done or the good provided. The implied cost of bad word-of-mouth or negative
online reviews may or may not be enough to induce the seller to provide high quality service. If
the seller possesses information on the extent of the buyer’s influence, her incentives to provide
high quality may now vary depending on the identity of the buyer.
Example 2: equitable treatment
An organization provides customer service. If it has information on the position of indivi-
duals in information-sharing networks, it may face a new incentive to neglect or prioritize users
based on their visibility to others, in order to promote the appearance of responsiveness. The
operating rules for the information-sharing network influence the extent to which the dialogue
between the organization and a user is transmitted to others.
204
CAMPBELL Data on Networks and Community Enforcement
Example 3: investigative journalism
Investigative consumer advocacy by local news teams is a classic example of the kind of
incentives at play in settings like these. Reluctant businesses are forced to confront complaints
after being featured on a news program with wide viewership, where localized ‘bad press’ from
an individual was not enough. This example raises the questions of what real-world institutions
may arise in response to the type of problem we study here and how effective they may be.
The idea of word-of-mouth as a punishment mechanism has been widely explored in the
literature on community enforcement in both many-to-many matching and one-to-many mat-
ching repeated games, in which high quality trade is sustained by some strategy for consumers
that takes into account previous experience of others. For example, Klein and Leﬄer (1981)
assumes that past play by a firm is public knowledge. Kandori (1992) analyzes cases in which
players are randomly matched in each stage and, respectively, know only their own history or
know some reputational ‘label’ attached to each player. Similarly, Okuno-Fujiwara and Post-
lewaite (1995) allows the ‘status’ of an individual’s matched player to be common knowledge
in the game. Ellison (1994) studies a similar random matching setting in which players are
anonymous and observe only the play in their own past games.
There is a significant related literature on social punishment in games with repeated bilateral
interaction among network insiders. For example, Jackson et al. (2012) analyzes social pressure
in a network structure as a means to sustain exchange. Their focus is on exchange structures that
are renegotiation-proof due to the protection of mutual friends of parties to a transaction. Their
framework fits slightly different applications to the one I will present here, since theirs considers
interactions between members of the network while I consider outsider-insider interactions.
This means that the concepts of redundancy and isolation in the network are slightly different,
and it permits me to focus on the value of different types of network data to the outsider.
A second example is Ali and Miller (2013), which considers the sustainability of bilateral
partnerships among insiders in a network in the presence of two-sided moral hazard. Players
can observe the history of play in their own relationships, but cannot observe how their mat-
ched partners have played in other relationships. In common with the outcomes in this paper,
networks featuring cliques are found to be good for cooperation and payoffs. The recursive dif-
fusion of information is a key consideration in their analysis, whereas I will assume skepticism
from insiders so that they never engage in punishment behavior unless and until the outsider
cheats a direct neighbor.
Closest to the model I present below is Ahn and Suominen (2001). Their model has an in-
termediate assumption on information transmission: a single seller transacts with many buyers
in an infinitely repeated game, in which one buyer is matched with the seller in each period and
some subset of the remaining buyers are selected to be ‘spectators’ to the transaction. Past play
and reputations are neither fully public or fully private, but instead information dissipates by
successive observation by groups of other players. Their model demonstrates that high quality
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trade can be supported in every period for a suitably large buyer population, even when the
probability of each buyer observing the seller’s choice in a given period is arbitrarily low. This
result depends on the assumption that the spectators to each transaction are randomly selected
and not determined by the identity of the buyer. This is qualitatively equivalent to the seller not
knowing the identity or characteristics of each buyer. An important addition that I make here is
to consider selection of spectators according to a pre-existing communication network.
In sum, I will focus here on an outsider-insiders structure and the valuation and strategic
implications of the availability of public or tradeable data on the precise structure of networks.
In particular I will consider the strategic incentive of the outsider to acquire or ignore precise
network data, the strategic incentive of network operators to publicize precise network data, and
the social value of precise network data.
2 Repeated Game Between Insiders and Outsider
A set of ‘insiders’ interacts with a single outsider over an infinite horizon in discrete time.
Denote the number of these insiders by n. The insiders are arranged in a network capturing
their lines of communication with each other, in a fashion we will specify shortly. At each date,
a single insider is selected at random to interact with the outsider in a stage game. It follows
that the probability of a given insider being selected at some time is 1n .
We may interpret the random selection mechanism as a ‘need’ for a product or service
arising in the population regularly but by chance, for example a car breaking down. Notice
that we therefore do not explicitly match to settings in which needs arise endogenously, and in
particular to the setting in which an insider’s propensity to engage the outsider depends on their
prior knowledge, who their neighbors are, or the history of the game. Similarly we do not deal
with the case in which the outsider strategically chooses who to visit when.1
The stage game played between insider and outsider has a strategy space and payoffs that






The outsider discounts future payoffs at the δ < 1, so that their total payoff is given by the




These payoffs are constructed to have two key features. First, the insider can effectively
‘shun’ the outsider by choosing not to engage the outsider, in which case both parties earn
a payoff of zero. Second, if engaged, the outsider faces a short-term temptation to behave
1This gives rise to the possibility that the order of visitation could signal something to insiders, an idea
discussed in, for example, Campbell (2015).
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dishonestly that we shall contrast with their long-term incentives. There are two unspecified
parameters. g > 0 is the ‘extra’ payoff to the outsider for dishonesty as compared to honesty in
the one-shot game. b > 0 is the loss to a swindled insider as compared to never having engaged
the outsider in the first place. However, since our analysis is qualitative, the relative magnitude
of these parameters does not play a big role.
Dishonesty is a weakly dominant strategy for the outsider in the stage game. The Nash
equilibria of the stage game have no engagement: the insider chooses not to engage, and the
outsider chooses dishonesty with sufficiently high probability. The object of our interest is the
possibility of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the repeated game in which all insiders—or,
as we shall see, as many as possible—choose to engage the outsider whenever they are selected
and are treated honestly by the outsider.
An insider’s neighbors are those other insiders who are precisely one degree away in the
network. A concept that will be important for our analysis is a neighborhood for some insider
i, which we define as the insider themselves plus their neighbors. Let us denote the number
of insiders in the neighborhood of i by xi. Following naturally from this, we will denote the
average neighborhood size in the network of insiders by x¯.
Assume that insiders use a local punishment rule that restricts them to the so-called ‘grim
strategy’ in the case in which they are aware that a network neighbor was treated dishonestly in
the past:
Definition 1 Local punishment rule: if in any prior period
(i) someone in an insider’s neighborhood was selected to play the stage game,
(ii) that person engaged the outsider, and
(iii) the outsider behaved dishonestly,
then the insider shall play ‘don’t engage’ whenever they are selected to play the stage game.
This rule has several noteworthy characteristics. First, it implies that either knowledge of devi-
ations does not travel beyond neighbors, or that insiders do not punish dishonest treatment of
those who are not their neighbors. Punishment behavior is not contagious (this contrasts with
the focus of the majority of the prior literature discussed earlier, which concerns the percolation
of information and inference through the network). Second, it is not necessarily sequentially
rational, in the sense that there is no consideration by the insider of any possible continuation
game in which they may receive a higher payoff by not following the local punishment rule.
Our conception of punishment can therefore be interpreted as both pro-social (or, if you prefer,
altruistic) and also conservative in its treatment of hearsay.
Our local punishment rule, when combined with a strategy profile in which all insiders
always choose engage and the outsider always chooses to be honest, comprises the ‘unforgiving
strategy profile’ in Ahn and Suominen (2001). The question that we will focus on is: to what
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extent does the local punishment rule insulate insiders against being treated dishonestly by the
outsider?
We may briefly note that there are surely other modeling approaches that would capture
similar forces to the one at play here. One alternative, for example, could be to view network
position as reflecting one’s outside option in a bargaining situation, with implications for the
disagreement payoff. The outcome of a bargaining process may then change depending on
whether this network data is known to the counter-party.
2.1 Continuation Payoffs and Putting a Bound on Honest Trade
The problem we analyze here is familiar from generic reputation games: cheat now versus future
cooperation. In checking whether strategies to form an equilibrium in this game, we must check
the outsider’s local continuation payoff in the event that they behave honestly against the one-
shot game from deviating. The ‘local’ here refers to the restriction on insiders’ strategies from
Definition 1: the repercussions from dishonesty are felt only in the neighborhood of the victim.
As in all repeated games, the continuation payoff and individual strategies could in general
be heavily path dependent in an equilibrium. We are taking a typical approach to this problem
by seeking to describe an upper bound on the amount of honest interaction. In this we are
assisted by the observation that, by forward induction, in equilibrium no continuation payoff
can include a payoff to the outsider of more than 1 in any future period t. That is, the outsider’s
strategy for the surrounding area cannot include being honest now while ‘waiting’ to defect
against another insider in the neighborhood, since in equilibrium that subsequent insider will
not buy. This means that the maximal local continuation payoff to the firm is that associated
with perpetually honest transactions with the selected insider and all of their neighbors.
2.2 The Outsider Knows Average Connectivity
First consider a situation in which the outsider knows a summary statistic about the network:
the average number of neighbors across all insiders. A situation in which the outsider knows
broadly similar summary statistics, for example density, would be qualitatively similar to this
one. So would a situation in which the outsider knew the precise structure of the network but
could not tell which insider was which when they are matched in the stage game. The crucial
point is that the outsider cannot meaningfully distinguish insiders from each other when they
are randomly selected to play the stage game.
In this situation the expected cost of dishonesty to the outsider is losing the possibility of
any positive payoff in the future in the neighborhood of the currently selected insider. The
probability of someone in that neighborhood being selected at a given future date is x¯n , the size
of the neighborhood relative to the total population.
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> 1 + g (1)






This is in precisely the same spirit as the result from Ahn and Suominen (2001), in which high
quality trade can be sustained indefinitely as long as there are a sufficiently large number of
spectators per transaction. Since the outsider is conditioning on the average neighborhood size
here, there is no distinction between spectators chosen at random each period, as in Ahn and
Suominen (2001), or fixed but unknown to the outsider, as in the present framework.
The intuition for this result is the well-known ‘shadow of the future’ (Dal Bo´, 2005). If the
expected loss from ‘cheating’ an insider today exceeds the one-shot gain from doing so, then
if all insiders choose to engage the outsider in each period, the outsider’s best response is to
cooperate throughout.
2.3 The Outsider Knows Insiders’ Position in the Network
Next consider a situation in which the outsider has fully personalized data on the structure of
the network and can identify each insider by their position in it. The outsider can now condition
their behavior on the location of the matched insider selected to play the stage game, and dif-
ferent neighborhood sizes mean different intensity of punishment under the local enforcement
rule.
Denote by x1 the size of the neighborhood of the insider with the smallest number of neig-
hbors. Since the discrepancies in continuation payoffs across neighborhoods are now known to
the outsider, we can observe that there exists an equilibrium with perpetual full engagement and






> 1 + g (3)






This is a ‘weakest link’ argument. Given the local enforcement rule, it is not credible that the
outsider would choose to play honestly if engaged by the insider with neighborhood x1. Their
social protection is not sufficient to outweigh the outsider’s one-shot gain from dishonesty. In a
network with a nondegenerate degree distribution, perpetual engagement and honest interaction
requires a strictly more patient outsider when the outsider has full information on the network
position of each insider.
We can develop the reasoning from Section 2.1 to identify the full set of insiders who are
vulnerable in this sense. The maximal continuation payoff in the neighborhood of i is given
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by the discounted stream of future payoffs of 1 in that neighborhood, xin
1
1−δ . It is therefore
unambiguously better for the outsider to be dishonest with insider i if




1 − δ (5)
This is just an inversion of condition 4 to identify insiders who will not engage the outsider in
equilibrium, since they will never be treated honestly.
But this is recursive. Consider the algorithm to construct a vulnerable set V of insiders from
the original network graph g:
1. Consider the insider j with the smallest neighborhood, x1.
2. Check condition 5. If it is not satisfied, end, else go to 3.
3. Put j in V . Update g to g′ = g − j. Return to 1.
The resulting vulnerable set are those insiders who will never receive honest treatment from the
outsider in equilibrium.
A very simple example of recursive vulnerability is shown in Figure 1. The three connecti-
ons of the node at the center of the four-person star do not provide social protection if the
neighbors are themselves vulnerable.
Figure 1: Vulnerability Can Be Recursive
If the threat of punishment in a neighborhood of size 2 cannot incentivize the outsider to behave
honestly with the peripheral insiders, then we can prune the periphery from consideration in the
continuation game, leaving the central insider on an island with no meaningful social protection.
This recursion has a flavor of contagion arguments, but in the outsider-insiders framework the
intuition is not cutting off ties with someone who wronged you, but rather losing the protection
of someone who cannot help to protect you.
We may briefly mention a feature of the vulnerable set that flows from the assumptions of
the local enforcement rule. Let us say that a network has a vulnerable set composed of some
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insiders but not all. At the margin of the vulnerable set—assuming that the network graph is
connected overall—we will have neighbors who straddle the boundary of the set. That is, one
insider may not engage the outsider, knowing that they will not receive honest treatment, while
their neighbor does engage the outsider, knowing that they will receive honest treatment.
The interesting aspect here is that the local enforcement rule has prescribed that if the vul-
nerable insider did ever engage—perhaps a ‘tremble’ or a misunderstanding—then the non-
vulnerable insider is bound to shun the outsider for the rest of time. This is the sense in which
the local enforcement rule is not sequentially rational. It therefore captures motivation out-
side the model, perhaps pro-social incentives to maintain friendships by sacrificing payoffs to
stick up for a friend. Absent such motivation, we may circumvent the issue by modifying the
punishment rule such that non-vulnerable insiders do not punish the cheating of vulnerable
insiders.
A second sense in which the punishment rule is not sequentially rational is that if any neig-
hbor is cheated, an insider may prefer not to punish the outsider if they have sufficiently many
remaining uncheated neighbors to support local cooperation. Since this does not depend on
whether the cheated neighbor was vulnerable, it cannot be circumvented by the same modifica-
tion of the punishment rule.
Another way to say all of this is that the equilibrium with maximal honest engagement
is built on punishment threats that never come to pass. Although it is outside the scope of this
model, in a different setting we may explore the implications of the insiders having to conjecture
and ‘feel out’ the propensity of the outsider to cheat, for example because they don’t know the
firm’s level of time preference.
For a formal analysis of these issues, in the related literature on social punishment to sus-
tain bilateral interactions between network insiders, Bloch et al. (2008), Lippert and Spagnolo
(2011), and Joshi and Mahmud (2016) all characterize stable network structures with explicit
concern for sequential rationality.
2.4 How Network Location Data Affects the Vulnerable Set
The outsiders’s knowledge of the network structure can increase, decrease or leave unchanged
the upper bound on honest engagement in the repeated game. Which of these happens depends
on the exact structure of the network, and we may draw some general conclusions here. In this
section we will stick to the interpretation of ‘knowledge’ of the network as capturing whether
the data available to the outsider is anonymous with respect to the insider’s location or not.
We have already seen from equation 4 that it is not possible for the outsider’s knowledge of
non-anonymous location data to admit a full honest engagement equilibrium if one did not exist
without that data. A simple case in which the outsider knowing the location of insiders in the
network matters is a three-node line (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Three-Node Line
In the three-node line the average neighborhood size is 73 but the smallest neighborhood size is
2. The anonymous data thus imposes more ‘discipline’ on the outsider. There is some level of
patience such that fully honest engagement can be perpetually sustained with anonymous data
but not without.
This is an example that generalizes: the network structures least conducive to fully honest
engagement are trees. These structures are such that there is precisely one path between any
two nodes in the network. For example, Figure 3 shows a single parent node with two children,
each of which has two children of its own, and so on. If a neighborhood of size 2 is not sufficient
to protect an insider, recursion will erode this tree entirely from bottom to top. In sum: if the
structure of connections among insiders is a tree, the vulnerable set is either empty or includes
every insider in the network. Either all are vulnerable, or none are. The same logic extends to
tree segments of larger network structures. For example, if the parent node of Figure 3 was a
bridge between the pictured segment and the rest of a larger network structure, then this segment
would either be wholly contained in the vulnerable set or wholly outside it.
Figure 3: Trees Are the Structure Most Fragile to Recursive Vulnerability
Conversely, cycles and cliques—which generate local redundancy in paths between two nodes—
are helpful. Figure 4 adds an edge to the four-person star.
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Figure 4: Adding a Cycle
In the non-anonymous world, ‘mutual friends’ are helpful to an insider. When insiders have
mutual friends, the risk of a recursive vulnerability emerging in their neighborhood is reduced.
Notice too that there is an externality effect operating on an insider’s incentive to create
or maintain links. With anonymous data, an insider can ‘hide’ behind average connectivity
in the network. Some of the benefit to an individual of forming new connections or fostering
mutual friendships is dispersed. By contrast, with non-anonymous data, the insider’s individual
connectivity is exposed. Their incentive to form new connections or foster mutual friendships
is therefore sharper, since the benefit flows to their own protection.
It is not always the case, though, that non-anonymous data reduces the upper bound on
honest engagement.
Figure 5: Adding a Cycle
The network in Figure 5 has an average neighborhood size of 113 . This is the level of discipline
on the outsider from anonymous social protection. With non-anonymous data, however, the
two peripheral ‘spokes’ are revealed to have neighborhoods of size 2, while each of the nodes
in the completely connected subgraph in the center have neighborhoods of size 4 in the event
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that the peripheral spokes are removed. There is therefore some discount factor δ such that all
are vulnerable in the anonymous data case, but the central four nodes are not vulnerable in the
non-anonymous data case.
The question at hand then becomes the minimum neighborhood size within subgraphs. The
recursive process of identifying the vulnerable set can be stopped by a firewall of connectivity
among a subset of insiders. In that sense, the problem of vulnerability here is a local one,
but an inescapably collective one. This is because while protection in the sense of this game
does not require a network-wide, top-down solution, we have also seen that for an individual to
increase their number of neighbors is not alone enough to increase protection. Rather protection
can be achieved piecemeal by actions to increase connectivity within a sufficiently populous
neighborhood by forging mutual connections among a set of insiders.
How many steps away an insider has to reach to forge those mutual connections depends on
how high the propensity to cheat is for the outsider. Is it enough to link friends with each other,
or does the insider have to work harder to link friends of friends? The answer depends on the
strength of incentives to cheat and cooperate in the stage game, and on the degree of patience
by the outsider. These parameters are potentially informed by the cultural and legal setting, as
well as by inherent preferences.
A general implication of the analysis of this game is that the outsider may prefer to com-
mit ex ante to ignorance of the precise structure of relationship networks among insiders. By
remaining in the dark, it avoids the risk that it will be cursed by the knowledge of who is vul-
nerable and who is not, leading to less honest engagement than before. Another way to say the
same thing is that it is possible in this game for the value of non-anonymous data on insider
connections to be negative for the outsider.
3 Network Operators and Examples
Consider online social networks as an example of an application of the model. As of 2015, 78%
of Fortune 500 companies have active Twitter accounts, and 74% have Facebook pages (Barnes
et al., 2016). No doubt there is a promotional aspect to this kind of activity, for example to
spread information about products (Campbell, 2012) or target launch promotions (Campbell,
2015).
However, there is evidence that there is a customer service motive at play too, such that
companies use Twitter to respond to public, visible complaints and concerns. In Figure 6 we
see telecommunications company Comcast quickly respond to a customer complaint, in sharp
contrast to the stereotype of being stuck on hold when calling for support on the telephone.
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Figure 6: Comcast Responding to a Tweet in 9 Minutes
The model in this paper speaks to possibly conflicting implications of this type of social media
interaction between a company and a customer. On one hand, a public online forum may be
thought of as providing a larger network neighborhood for a customer than their oﬄine circle
of friends, increasing the discipline imposed on the outsider. On the other hand, the same publi-
cness may reveal differences in the extent of each individual’s network connections, decreasing
the discipline imposed on the outsider when engaging with sparsely connected customers. A
business may feel a stronger incentive to placate a complaint on Twitter from a person with one
million followers than from a person with one hundred.
As the model showed, these are not independent issues: the recursive nature of the second
could unravel any benefit from the first. Together they mean that the outsider faces a commit-
ment problem. Ex ante it would prefer to tie its hands to eschew information about insiders’
network positions to avoid unraveling, but ex post it would prefer to learn this information in
order to treat different insiders differently.
In this environment, the network operator has discretion over the rules of the game. It can
influence who sees interactions between insider and outsider, which we may view as influencing
the connectivity of the communication network. It can also choose the extent to which the out-
sider can observe or purchase individualized data on the network neighborhood of each insider.
These related and conflicting concerns are characteristic of the structure of popular online com-
munication platforms in general. In some sense all such platforms present hybrid cases that do
not initially seem to fit neatly into either anonymous or non-anonymous designations, but which
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taken as a whole can be interpreted through the lens of the model of community enforcement.
3.1 Twitter
On Twitter, communication is varied and layered: all communication is in theory public unless a
user has opted out, but in practice swamped by vast volume unless it is sought. Direct messages
are a channel for one-to-one private communication, and ‘mentions’ are something of a hybrid.
In September 2016, TechCrunch reported on new features launched by Twitter to deliver
customer service functionality (Perez, 2016). Interestingly, though, it is not clear whether the
changes are designed to increase or decrease visibility of complaints. On one hand, the new
features include a publicly visible ‘responsiveness’ metric, to indicate how quickly the company
responds to customers. On the other hand, it admits new direct messaging functionality that in
principle nudges customers and companies to take their conversations out of the public network
and into private messaging.
The tension here is suggestive of the type of conflicting incentives present in our repeated
game model: publicness is a mixed blessing. In Figure 6, Comcast may have been disciplined
to respond to the customer complaint in the public forum of Twitter, but it would perhaps
would prefer such interactions to be conducted in private. Twitter’s new features appeared to
favor taking interactions from a large-neighborhood public setting to an atomized-neighborhood
private setting.
By taking the content of the interaction between insider and outsider out of the public view,
the platform may feel that it is protecting the outsider from contagious bad publicity. Howe-
ver, as we have seen, exposing and isolating weakly-connected insiders makes the structure
of the communication network less conducive to community enforcement. A policy like this
could therefore have the unintended consequence of reducing the amount of mutually beneficial
engagement between insiders and outsiders.
3.2 Facebook
We see a similar ambiguity in Facebook’s Pages, launched in 2007 as a tool for companies to
interact with customers, but with an important difference. Pages permitted companies to see
the network ‘reach’ of customers who chose to engage, but also makes communication between
brand and customer visible to all other engaged consumers.
One way to view this quasi-public communication is, as discussed in the analysis of the
model, to bind the hands of the ‘outsider’ in the face of differentiated network data. Rather
than attempt to anonymize the insider’s position, Pages can instead render it irrelevant by es-
sentially creating communication links among all insiders who have ‘liked’ the outsider’s Page.
The communication network for community enforcement is no longer only the revealed reach
of a customer’s prior social neighborhood, but the more richly connected neighborhood that
incorporates the Page.
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This effect is quite different from that of Twitter’s tools. Both platforms permit various
types of communication between insider and outsider on a spectrum from private to pu-
blic. But the direction that each platform’s policies push is toward opposite ends of that
spectrum. The approach that enlarges the insider’s neighborhood and publicizes communi-
cation within it is better justified by the lessons of the community enforcement model, since
this fosters network structures with less vulnerability.
3.3 Privacy Concerns
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Instagram have all increasingly offered fine controls to
users that allow them to tailor the visibility of individual communications, rather than tie
them to the same communication network for all purposes. This discretion is designed in
part to address privacy concerns, and the agency of insiders to choose their network on the
fly is one direction in which the model we have analyzed here could be extended.
As we have seen, a novel concern raised by the ambiguous value of non-anonymous net-
work data is what the effect could be on the contracting problem between network operators
and outsiders. It is tempting to view personalized data on insiders as valuable to the outsider
but harmful to insiders who would prefer their data to be kept private. How can a network
operator monetize its detailed information on people’s connections if there is a possibility
that the knowledge might be toxic?
Prior literature has studied the interplay between consumers’ control over data on their
characteristics and relationships on one hand, and commercial use of that data on the other
hand. A common theme in previous work in this area is the tension between the ability
of organizations to improve their product offerings through the use of consumer data and
consumer distaste for feeling violated by the use of this data (Miller and Tucker, 2009,
Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011, Tucker, 2014, Campbell et al., 2015).
The ability of social networks to provide community protection is an additional factor
that may contribute to regulatory concerns in this area. It suggests one sense in which the
availability and trade of data on the relationships and lines of communication among con-
sumers across various platforms could be bad for all parties. Local and aggregate trust in
long-term relationships may be eroded by the publicness of network data in unexpected
ways. The evolving tools employed and offered by modern communication platforms re-
flects a searching in the dark for the appropriate balance among many competing concerns.
But, in this community enforcement application, it can be that anonymizing data may be
beneficial to all—good for the privacy of network insiders, and good for the incentives of
outsiders who would engage them.
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3.4 Lessons for Platform Owners
In sum, the model in this paper suggests several implications for platform operators. First,
individualized data on insiders’ positions in the network graph may have negative value to
outsiders. This is likelier when connectivity is on average high but varies widely. Data on
insiders’ characteristics would then be more valuable to the outsider and engagement would be
higher with anonymized data on connectivity. Conversely, if connectivity is on average low but
varies widely, network data would be more valuable to the outsider and engagement would be
higher with non-anonymized data on connectivity.
Second, if the platform operator wishes to take actions to enhance the value of network
data to outsiders, it matters whether the data is anonymized or not. Average connectivity is
important for honest and trustworthy engagement if the data is anonymized, but the operator
must pay attention to the whole distribution of connectivity, not just the average, if data is
personalized. Local sparseness and vulnerability in some area of the network cannot be ignored
due to the problem of recursivity.
Third, actions by the platform operator that foster network closure, cliques, and visibility of
communication between insider and outsider are good for well-functioning community enforce-
ment. It may seem that outsiders are well served by the platform operator taking communication
between them and insiders out of the public part of the network, but this is counterproductive. A
commitment to communication visible to an enlarged neighborhood binds the outsider to better
long-run outcomes in the face of short-run temptation to shirk.
4 Concluding Comments
In general, the value data on communication networks has for interested parties and for society
is a difficult question to answer. Here we have explored one sense in which recursion and non-
linearities can complicate valuation, but there are certainly others. What we can say for sure is
that the problem is very different in nature from placing a value on other kinds of demographic
data that allow for a better match of product to tastes. The importance of information and
communication in an array of economic models and settings makes data on communication
networks a unique case rich with potential unintended consequences.
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